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Introduction 
This book gathers essays that are all, in one way or another, connected with 
ancient Greek and Roman religions. The essays cover a wide range-both 
chronological and geographical-of religious discourse and practice from 
Classical Athens on to seventeenth-century America via medieval Europe. Thus, 
there is no attempt at comprehensiveness. Rather, we hope that these essays will 
serve to problematize some common distinctions that readers generally bring to 
the study of ancient Greek and Roman religion and its legacy-such as the 
distinctions between Greece and Rome, Greco-Romans and barbarians, pagans 
and Christians, religion and politics, and religion and magic, to name some that 
are more prominently addressed in this collection. 
In the context of ancient Greece, it would be thoroughly meaningless even to 
attempt disentangling the sacred from the profane. Religion pervades ancient 
Greek culture to such a degree that the complex of myth and ritual that 
constitutes worship is not thought of as a distinct phenomenon by the Greeks 
themselves: since there are no aspects of life that are not penneated by religion, 
there exists, in fact-and as many before have noted-no word in the Greek 
language to describe the aggregate of beliefs and cult practices that we modems 
would like to designate with the Latin-derived word "religion." To understand 
Greek culture means to understand Greek religion, and vice-versa. 
This "embeddedness"1 of Greek religion has many consequences. Myth and 
ritual are not only sources of poetry, but poetry in turn seeks to explain, promote, 
and influence Greek ritual practices. Similarly, iconography reflects this 
"embeddedness" and analyses of visual narratives, just like literary ones, need to 
take it into consideration. 
Religion is very much "embedded" in Rome as well The Romans did have a 
tenn, religio, which, as its etymology suggests, denoted in its usual positive 
sense the obligatory bonds between humans and gods. But this tenn, and others 
I. See Bremmer 1994:2-4, Price 1999:3. 
xi 
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like it such as pietas, were not stable, and Roman religion was, like Greek, non­
theological and socially pervasive. As one scholar puts it, all the various media 
through which religion is represented constitute different types of "religious 
knowledge";2 one is not more "real" to religion than any other. The problem of 
the reality of Roman religion has, in fact, come partially from the particular 
involvement political figures had always had in it, with chief magistrates 
occupying the most prominent priesthoods.3 This continues to be the case even 
under Augustus, when it becomes the prerogative of the imperial family to 
accumulate priestly offices, something that exceeded the normal right of a 
magistrate.4 
The "embeddedness" of religion after the fourth century A.D. takes on a new 
dimension as the Christian church, in all its doctrinal and ritual multiplicity, 
enters into an alliance with the imperial court. The relationship between rival 
forms of Christianity, Christianity and other religions, and Christian worship and 
other modes of social and political life become paramount subjects for reflection 
and debate. Christianity becomes not merely the cult sanctioned by the state, but 
a "totalizing" religion that claims authority over all aspects of life. The 
interpenetration of religion and social life, a social "fact" in earlier times, is at 
the center of an ambitious program for the transformation of late-antique society. 
The division of this book into three parts reflects some of the major thematic 
correspondences of the papers. The first two parts deal with the problem of 
religious identity against an idea of "improper" worship, with respect to two 
different types of religious relationships-that between fellow-worshippers, and 
that between worshippers and human beings who have become recipients of cult. 
The third and last section deals with the iconography of the Late 
Roman/Byzantine periods, focusing on ways in which earlier pagan practices are 
subsumed or redefined by Christianity. This tripartite division, however, does 
not in any way imply that the themes themselves exist independently of each 
other: there are numerous overlaps between sections, and just as ancient religion 
itself is embedded in the fabric of ancient life, the religious practices discussed 
here do not exist in isolation, but are part of the complex of myths and practices 
2. Feeney 1998. Feeney's specific concern is to challenge modern scholarship's habit 
of treating the literary manifestations of Roman religion as secondary to (rather than 
integrative with) ritual practice. 
3. Wissowa 1912 and Latte 1960 saw the public nature of Roman religion as a mark of 
decline from the archaic period. Cf. Fowler 1911 and 1914. 
4. Beard, North, and Price I 998: 186-92. 
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that make up ancient religion. 
Part I, "Ancient Religion, Self and Other," deals with communities of fellow­
worshippers, and asks how individuals were able to define themselves with and 
against other human beings in the realm of religion, thus marking their own 
religious practices or beliefs as licit in contrast to the practices and beliefs of 
"others." As such, this question forms a part of the pervasive and dynamic 
discourse of identity in the ancient world, in which it was habitual to define 
oneself "oppositionally"-that is, against what one was not. We can chart some 
of these ideological oppositions with greater ease than we can others: for 
example, despite the variety of political systems among the poleis, that which 
was called "tyranny" became, by the classical period, by definition "un-Greek." 
But what is most important is that identity was, as it is today, subjective: while 
the main terms of opposition between one's own cultural practices and those of 
others, once established, tended to stay the same on a rhetorical level (Greeks 
continued to imply barbarians as their opposite, Romans barbarians, Christians 
pagans), these were all constructed categories, taking on different meanings from 
moment to moment and individual to individual. 
Religion is perhaps among the more difficult areas to pin down when we talk 
about identity. Greek and Roman religions represent a spectrum of practices that 
varied locally, and were also importantly shaped throughout history by 
intercultural contacts. The use in recent years of the plural "religions" instead of 
the singular by some scholars (for example, Simon Price, in his recent book 
Religions of the Ancient Greeks) is an obvious allusion to the breadth of this 
spectrum. Greeks and Romans were certainly capable of understanding other 
polytheistic systems through syncretism. But this does not imply that they did not 
have a sense of religious propriety, nor does it imply that they were "tolerant" of 
other religions, what many scholars today see as a modem concept which posits 
polytheism against the "intolerant" monotheism of Christianity.5 Rather, Greeks 
and Romans combined an acceptance of regional variation and of the reality of 
other people's religions, as well as (in periods of expansion) a realistic sense of 
how far religious authority could be extended to foreign subjects on the one 
hand, with a powerful impulse to protect their own religions from outside 
influences on the other. 
Next to the historical facts of intercultural contact, however, must be placed 
Greek and Roman rhetorical habits of "othering," for by examining these we 
5. E.g., Garnsey 1984. 
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receive the most profound insights into the subjective experiences of 
worshippers. Besides the explicit assignation of the label "barbarian" by both 
Greeks and Romans to the religious practices of others, one of the other primary 
modes of"othering" is the attribution of the label "magician" or "magic" to those 
who are perceived as different and to their religious practices. The very difficult 
problem of magic and how we can define it in relation to religion is addressed in 
very different contexts in two of the chapters in this section, as well as a number 
of others in this volume. Criticism of Frazer's and Malinowski's distinction 
between magic and religion has engendered deep suspicion of rigid cross­
cultural definitions of magic.6 Anthropologists have come to understand that our 
modem notions of magic and religion are not applicable to. other cultural 
contexts;7 this principle applies as well to Christian ones prior to the 
Reformation.8 Graf suggests that we follow the lead of recent anthropological 
approaches in viewing ancient magic not through our own commonsensical 
notions but rather through the ancient rhetoric of magic itself.9 This rhetoric 
reveals on a basic level that in the Greek and Roman worlds, "magic" (at least 
after its initial appearance as the practice of the Persian magi)10 is the name 
given to a collection of practices that are in conflict with the rules of the larger 
society, whatever these practices may be. As a number of these papers will 
reflect, however, the nature and depth of this conflict is variable: it is at times 
difficult to distinguish "magical" aspects from what was considered acceptable 
religious practice. In the words of one scholar (comparing literary and 
documentary texts on magic), "Magic, among most serious writers, is something 
that Others do, but the lead tablets and papyri of antiquity clearly prove that the 
6. See Tambiah 1990 for a discussion of the reaction to Frazer and Malinowski among 
contemporary anthropologists. 
7. For the development of the modem distinction between magic and religion and its 
connection to the rise of modem science in seventeenth-century England, see Tambiah 
1990: 1-15; for the modem concept of religion, see Smith 1991: 15-50. Frazer understood 
magic as a misunderstanding of the laws of causality and hence an irrational precursor of 
modem science; this leads to a hasty dismissal of other cultures as irrational. For the 
disturbing political implications of this view in the context of contemporary 
globalization, see Tambiah 1990: 111-154. 
8. See Thomas 1971, especially chapters 2, 3, and 9 (reference owed to Rebecca 
Lesses). 
9. Graf 1997. 
10. E.g., Plato Alcib iades 1.22. 
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Others were among the Greeks themselves."11 What is especially interesting to 
note is the longevity of the conflict: Christianity continued to use magic as a 
marker of alterity, and, as such, magic could be explicitly connected to or 
conflated with the ancient pagan tradition. We will return to the intersection of 
magic and Christianity in greater detail in part III. 
The four chapters in part I demonstrate ways in which perceptions of ethnic, 
cultural, and/or political differences among ancient communities are reflected in 
religion on both a mythical and ritual level. Part I is divided into two sections, 
the first on Greek practice (Greeks and Others), the second on Roman (Roman 
Magic and Religion from Two Perspectives). Within each section the first 
chapter focuses, loosely speaking, on the insider's point of view of proper Greek 
and Roman practice (chapter I: the Athenians; chapter 3: Roman literary writers 
of the Augustan age), the second chapter on the outsider's point of view (chapter 
2: recently Hellenized cities of Imperial Asia Minor; chapter 4: Christians 
invoking the "pagan" past). The first two chapters present two instances of 
syncretism in the Greek world, one between Greeks and the Thracians, a 
traditionally "barbarian" group, and the other between a Panhellenic oracle in 
Asia Minor and its foreign cliente/ae. Both speak to the limits of syncretization 
in the Greek world, and explore methods of differentiation. Of the two chapters 
that follow, the first studies the reification of Roman water as a divine substance 
by Livy, Propertius, and Ovid; the second, that of Iroquois practices that were 
labeled "pagan" and "magical" by seventeenth-century Jesuit missionaries who 
were influenced by the anti-Roman rhetoric of late antiquity. In both cases, the 
attitudes of the observers are shaped by an anachronistic projection of the 
Roman religious past onto the present. 
The period after the fifth-century Persian wars was the moment during which 
Greeks began to define themselves ideologically against a "barbarian" other, 12 
11. Braarvig J.997:51. 
12. The interest in the ideological implications of the Greek/barbarian dichotomy can 
be traced back to two major literary studies from the 1980s, those of Frant;ois Hartog 
( 1988, on Herodotus) and Edith Hall ( 1989, on Athenian tragedy); the latter is 
responsible for attaching the emergence of self-definition to the Persian threat and its 
defeat. For the work that combines historical, linguistic, and archaeological analysis with 
the anthropological insight that ethnic identities are subjectively constructed, see 
Jonathan M. Hall's 1996 book Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity. Hall emphasizes the 
primacy of mythical genealogies in the construction of Greek identity prior to the Persian 
wars period. For an excellent overall treatment of identity and alterity among the Greeks, 
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establishing a pattern that would last throughout Greek antiquity and would be 
imitated by the Romans as well.13 The inseparability of religion from the social 
and political life of the polis14 is reflected in the ways in which Greekness was 
defined in the classical period. In a famous passage, Herodotus includes 
religious criteria among those that, to him, define Greekness: to be Greek is to be 
bound by "kinship . . . in blood and speech, and the shrines of gods and the 
sacrifices that we [Greeks] have in common, and the likeness of our way of 
life ... " (Histories, Book 8.144). Myths and rituals were closely attached to the 
individual polis, and thus showed very considerable local variation, 15 but 
nevertheless reflected a mythology (e.g., the pantheon of twelve gods) and 
heeded a set of rules (e.g., those concerning sacred spaces) that were common to 
all Greek city-states.16 This Panhellenic base of Greek religion was reflected 
ritually as well, for example, in the popular competitions at Olympia, Delphi, 
Nemea, and lsthrnia. 
It is within the context of this belief in an essential biological, cultural, and 
political Greekness and its dependence on a barbarian opposite that we must 
understand polis religion. In chapter l ,  "Barbarian Bond: Thracian Bendis 
among the Athenians," Corinne Ondine Pache examines classical Athenian 
attitudes toward the establishment and existence of a foreign cult in their midst. 
The Thracians are particularly interesting because their status between Greek 
and barbarian is ambiguous in a way that sets them apart from other typically 
barbarian groups.17 Pache's survey of the Greek view of the Thracians from 
Homer to Thucydides suggests that they were seen as politically and 
economically important to Greece but also culturally alien. Their in-between 
status is reflected at Athens in their unusual position in the cult of the Thracian 
goddess Bendis, whom the Athenians clearly wished to appropriate as their own. 
In the last half of the fifth century, the Athenians made the unusual move of 
see Paul Cartledge's 1993 book (see note 13 below). For "Romanitas" in the empire see 
G. Woolf 1994 (on Greece) and 1998 (on Gaul). 
13. This dichotomy has earned a privileged position in studies on the Greek world: 
note, for example, the title given by Cartledge to his wide-ranging study of Greek 
thought-The Greeks: A Portrait of Self and Others. 
14. Sourvinou-lnwood 1990. 
15. Cole 1990. 
16. Price 1999:3-6. 
17. The closest analogy is perhaps the Macedonians, who were also from "up north," 
and who would eventually conquer Thrace under Philip II. 
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allowing Bendis into their pantheon. Interestingly, however, the Athenians and 
the Thracian noncitizens never worshipped together but maintained separate 
cults of Bendis, demonstrating how the ideology of otherness was able to 
maintain the boundary between Greek and barbarian religion without denying 
itself the right to appropriate a foreign deity. 
In the expanded world of the Hellenistic and Roman periods, the definition of 
Greekness, which naturally shifted according to context even in the classical 
period, could expand as well to include those who, although they may have not 
been of Hellenic blood, were culturally Hellenized. Panhellenism was thus still 
ideologically efficacious, especially in the period of Greek cultural flourishing in 
the empire. This is as true of religion as of anything else, even with respect to 
Roman state cult (as we will see in the second section). On the other hand, the 
level of intercultural interaction at the time among Greek, Roman, indigenous, 
and Jewish and Christian traditions, combined with the Greek penchant for 
syncretistic behavior, complicates the notion of a rigid differentiation between 
Greek and barbarian practices. 
Chapter 2, "Magic, Religion, and Syncretism at the Oracle of Claros" by 
Zsuzsanna Varhelyi, studies the relationship between the oracle of Apollo at 
Claros and a number of its client states in the second and third centuries A.O. 
While the client states were not quite traditionally "barbaric" in the way that 
Thrace had been, they tended to be non-Ionian or only recently Hellenized, and 
they did not traditionally consult Apollonic oracles. Similarly to Pache's study, 
this chapter describes a syncretistic practice in which the symbols of Panhellenic 
religion coexist harmoniously with symbols of "otherness," in what Varhelyi 
calls a "soft politics of difference." So while the inscriptions found on Claros of 
the client states' visits to the oracle demonstrate language peculiar to the cult of 
Apollo, the oracular responses, which were set up in the client states and not at 
the Clarian site itself, often use language normally associated with magic and 
with chthonian religion, and appear to reflect the local concerns of each state. An 
analysis of the language of the responses, all of which provide countermeasures 
to a plague, suggests that the client cities, in fact, had more significant roles in 
interpreting the plague's causes than the oracle. 
On the other hand, acceptable and nonacceptable religious practices needed to 
be distinguished. Not all practices could be syncretized, among them those that 
involved practices regularly considered magical. While magic was not 
necessarily associated with barbarism per se (that is, with classically barbarian 
peoples and places), as a phenomenon that is not attached to the polis it is 
marked as being "outside" normal religious practice. But the picture of magic is 
complex here: hymns that were prescribed by the oracles do not show outright 
rejection of magic, which in the empire, Graf has suggested, was moving toward 
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divination. 18 While the Stoic overtones of the hymns allowed them to overtly 
avoid magical reference, at the same time their very performance could represent 
a traditionally magical function. Thus, Varhelyi suggests, the dominant 
opposition at Claros cannot have been simply that between magic and religion 
per se, but between nonphilosophical and philosophical understandings of the 
divine. 
Similarly to the Greeks, the religious identity of the Romans was inseparable 
from their identity as Romans: "We have the notion, which [the Romans) did 
not, of an individual having a 'religious identity' that can be distinguished from 
his or her identity as a citizen or as a family member. If asked what we are, we 
can say a 'Catholic,' a 'Moslem,' 'an atheist. "'19 The conceptual borders of 
religion were policed like the conceptual borders of the state. Even though the 
Romans were engaged, from as far back as the sixth century, in a continual 
dialogue with Greek culture (which naturally included religion), religious 
innovation at Rome was confined to the early and middle republic,20 and only 
under Caracalla in the third century was a new cult, that of Isis and Serapis, 
given a place in the official religion.21 On the other hand, as with the Greeks, 
while we can always see the rhetoric of otherness on the surface, it can be 
difficult to distinguish purely "Roman" practices from those of"others." To take 
one important example, anyone who believes (as we think that one must) that the 
process by which Romans incorporated the ·religion of Graeca capta was 
creative rather than derivative in nature will understand how difficult it is to 
posit an authentic "Roman" against "Greek" religious experience. 
In chapter 3, "Saving Water: Early Floods in the Forum," Prudence J. Jones 
studies the mythological use of water as a sacred buffer against threats to the 
Roman state in the literature of Augustan Rome. 22 At a time when the alteration 
of the Tiber was seen as both necessary and potentially offensive to the gods, 
Roman writers circulated stories of the Tiber's past that reflected a cooperative 
relationship between Romans and the numinous landscape. This is seen 
particularly in stories concerning the ancient struggle between the Romans and 
the Sabines. Jones argues that the Tiber is seen as a supernatural force that 
protects Rome against anti-Roman forces, but is itself resistant to being used for 
18. Graf 1999. 
19. Beard, North, and Price 1998:43. 
20. North 1976 and 1979. 
21. Garnsey and Saller 1987:170. 
22. On the relationship between Roman literature and religion, see Feeney 1999. 
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supernatural ends by someone who tries to harm Rome. The distinction between 
good and bad religion involves "ethnic" difference in an interesting way, one that 
reflects imperial Rome's efforts to civilize foreigners to become Roman, as well 
as touches on the issue of magical practice. The two central figures here, Tarpeia 
and Mettius Curtius, were both originally Sabines, but while the former 
represents the threat of the barbaric, the latter positively represents the 
incorporation of the Sabines into Rome. This is reflected by the fact that Tarpeia 
is unsuccessful in her attempt to use witchcraft to betray Rome, and, conversely, 
in the water's supernatural aid to Mettius. Jones also makes an important 
connection here between the invocation of these early myths and the necessity 
that Roman citizens may have felt to compensate for the potentially impious 
alteration of the Roman landscape in Augustus' great engineering projects. 
In chapter 4, "Magic, Dreams, and Ritual in the Iroquois Conversion," Kate 
Blair-Dixon presents a case study in the transmission of late Mediterranean 
thought, in which Roman magic serves as a model of the "other" from a 
Christian viewpoint. Blair-Dixon demonstrates the way in which seventeenth­
century Jesuits appropriated early Christian attitudes toward the Romans in 
dealing with the "pagan" Iroquois of North America. Predisposed to Augustine's 
dualistic view of Christianity and paganism as, respectively, "good" and "evil," 
but also influenced by Gregory the Great's syncretistic view, which held that 
pagans could be converted, Jesuits at first expected the Iroquois to convert. As 
their mission continued, however, the difficulties of conversion caused the 
Jesuits to create a more powerful rhetoric of difference, one in which the 
religious practices of the Iroquois were branded "magic," in opposition to the 
Jesuits' own "religion," using Roman paganism as their map of understanding. 
Again, magic serves as a category of explaining the other, in reference to 
variable practices. It is powerful testimony to the general applicability of the 
category of "magic" that among the benefits of attributing magic to the Iroquois 
was the Jesuits' self-affirmation as "rational" against Protestant accusations in 
the Reformation debates that they themselves were "magicians." 
Part II, "Man, Hero or God?" shifts focus away from relationships among 
communities of worshippers to the relationships between worshippers and those 
individuals who cross the line between the human and the divine, heroes and 
deified rulers. Heroes are human beings who undergo immortalization after their 
death and become recipients of heroic sacrifice. Starting in the Hellenistic period 
with Alexander the Great, some human beings are granted divine status while 
they are still living and they receive cult similar to those conferred to gods. 
All three chapters explore the constitutive function of literary narratives and 
the link between literature and cult. Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the role of 
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literature as creator and promoter of the divine status of two different rulers: 
Alexander the Great and Augustus. With Alexander the Great, the practice of 
assimilating ruler with god was born. After his reign, the custom of granting 
divine status to rulers continued with his successors. Ruler cults varied greatly in 
different areas of Greece, and although the cults were popular, there was always 
a great deal of controversy surrounding the practice. Although Greek hero cult 
comes first chronologically, part II starts with two chapters devoted to ruler cult 
in the imperial period, and concludes with a chapter focusing on one late 
interpretation of Greek hero cult. 
Traditionally, heroes and heroines are studied in terms of the roles they 
performed as living beings (whether they are construed as purely mythic or 
historical characters), and their status as objects of worship after their death is 
explained in tenns of these functions: city founders, warriors, prophets, healers, 
lawgivers, discoverers, inventors, ancestors. Heroes provide a focal point for 
ritual, and furnish an explanation for the existence and cohesion of particular 
sociopolitical groups: polis, gene, phratries, or orgeones.23 These are themes that 
have engaged historians and sociologists alike for a long time, and hero cult-as 
is made clear again and again by archaeological and epigraphical evidence-is 
central to any explanation of these ancient institutions. 
Nineteenth-century classicists explained hero worship in two ways. Some 
understood it a s  a form of ancestor worship, others as a ritual performed for 
downgraded deities.24 The debate on hero cult, then, long centered on this 
23. Parker 1996:37-39. 
24. Two famous names associated with this debate come to mind: Rohde 1894 saw the 
origins of hero cult in ancestor cults, while Usener 1896, by contrast, argued that heroes 
derived from ancient Sondergotter whose particular function is often reflected in their 
names (latros, Strategos, etc.). Rohde and Usener approached the question of hero 
worship from very different perspectives, and although it was a central focus for neither 
of them, they later came to be perceived as the spokesmen for these two opposite points­
of-view. Friedrich Pfister's 1912 landmark study Der Reliquienkult im Alter/um-siding 
with Usener on the question of the divine origin of hero cult-showed the importance of 
the hero's physical remains and grave, thereby linking hero worship with Christian relic 
cult, and establishing a close parallel between pagan heroes and Christian saints. Foucart 
1922:67 maintained-following in the tracks of Rohde-that "the Greeks never doubted 
their Heroes had been men." Meanwhile Farnell 1921 adopted a combination of these 
two views and developed a compromise approach to the problem: he argued that all 
heroes were not necessarily to be explained by one single origin, and he divided them 
Introduction xxi 
dichotomy between understanding heroes as powerful dead human beings or 
local, demoted gods until Brelich offered a radically new approach in his 1958 
study, Gli eroi greci. By examining ritual and myth together in their historical 
context, Brelich undertook the study of hero cult as a whole and sought to 
understand heroes in terms of wider cultural patterns rather than by focusing on 
the differences between them. Brelich's "morphological" approach brought forth 
a new openness and new rigor to the study of the phenomenon that have greatly 
enriched our understanding of hero cult. 
While hero cult and ancestor worship were practiced in both Greece and 
Rome, the worship of living beings represents a revolutionary development. A 
crucial distinction needs to be made between the heroic and the divine: while 
some important Panhellenic heroes occasionally received divine sacrifice,2s 
heroes are never deified. Heroes' bodies are-notionally or actually-buried at 
the place of worship and at the center of the hero cult. Thus, hero cult is by 
definition a local cult. Ruler cult, by contrast, ascribes divinity to human beings 
during their lifetime. Starting with Alexander the Great, powerful leaders began 
to receive divine honors while they were still alive on account of their great 
political or military prowess. While Roman ruler cult is ultimately influenced by 
Greek practices, ruler cults of Alexander and Augustus differ in many essential 
ways. 
The Romans, like the Greeks, offered sacrifices to their dead, but until the 
Hellenistic period had no tradition of granting divine status to living human 
beings. Some Roman administrators in Greek cities began to receive divine cult 
at the end of the third century B.C. The practice gradually reached Rome itself, 
and the second century B.C. saw certain Roman citizens receiving divine honors. 
While the practice originated with Alexander the Great, ruler cult takes a 
different shape in Rome, and by the time Julius Caesar was granted divine 
honors in 45 B.C., the ritual had become a Roman one. On the other hand, 
outside of Rome, public cult took different forms in the east and west (although 
we should be careful not to emphasize the divide between the Romanization of 
the east and that of the west, in general, too greatly).26 Whereas Greeks tended to 
maintain a Greek identity and were thus generally able to interpret the cult of the 
emperor in Greek terms, western worshippers seem to have acquired a Roman 
into seven categories. 
25. See for example, the double cult ofHerakles as described in Pausanias. 
26. See, e.g., Woolf 1994. 
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identity.27 What they had in common was the fact that all subjects were required 
to recognize Roman gods alongside their own. 
Ruler cult and issues surrounding the worship of living beings were 
problematic fl'om the outset with the cult of Alexander, and would present their 
own problems for the Romans. In chapter 5, Spencer Cole focuses on Caesar's 
adoptive son, Octavian, and his acquiring divine status during his lifetime. Cole 
explores the process by which Rome appropriates and transforms aspects of 
Greek cult, and more particularly he examines the fundamental role played by 
contemporary poets in formulating and securing immortality for Augustus. Cole 
sees the deification of Augustus as an ongoing process that is articulated in part 
through poeti,y. Vergil's and Horace's poetry play an essential role in helping 
create and define Augustus' divine status, yet both authors also express great 
ambivalence toward this divine status. They shift Augustus' position along the 
continuum human-hero-god, and, ultimately, both poets resist providing a 
definitive answer to the question of deification. Cole, like Asirvatham in chapter 
6, concludes that literature is used both to shape and to allow reflection on 
ideologically problematic religious practices. 
The ruler cult of Alexander, first chronologically, also remained a source of 
interest and inspiration for later writers, as witnessed in Sulochana R. 
Asirvatham 's study of the negotiation of Alexander's divinity in Plutarch's life 
of Alexander. In chapter 6, Asirvatham examines the process by which Plutarch, 
a Greek writer of the Second Sophistic, uses human foils and religious 
symbols-more specifically, the snake and proskynesis (obeisance�to prop up 
Alexander's cultural and political "Greekness." Plutarch uses the motif of 
Alexander's divinity as a way of demarking the line between the "Greek" and 
"barbarian" elements in Alexander's character. The use of the Greek/barbarian 
dichotomy to characterize Alexander suggests that, for Plutarch, this man is to be 
judged with the same social criteria as are other human beings in their 
relationship to the divine. He presents deification as acceptable if it is based on 
the king's virtue, virtue which in tum is a manifestation of the divine element in 
the human soul. Finally. Asirvatham also places Plutarch's use of Alexander's 
religiosity in its own historical context of imperial cult and analyzes it as a 
mechanism by which Greek communities understood Rome. That Greeks could 
understand not only Alexander's ruler cult but also Roman ruler cult in 
Panhellenic terms is reflected in such institutions as the well-known 
27. Beard, North, and Price I 998:3 I 4ff. 
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Panhellenion, by which Greeks were able to worship Hadrian alongside Zeus 
Panhellenios. 28 
In chapter 7, Ellen Bradshaw Aitken turns to hero cult. While this practice 
chronologically precedes ruler cult, she focuses on one second-century A.D. 
interpretation of hero cult. The Heroikos is a unique work that gives a blueprint, 
as it were, of hero worship. Philostratus' dialogue first sets out to prove the 
existence of heroes, and the need to worship them. The conversation between the 
vinedresser and the Phoenician explores the problems of correct ritual practices, 
and Aitken analyzes the relationship between text and ritual practice. The 
Heroikos seeks to persuade its readers of the need for proper cult through the use 
of the hero "come back to life." Aitken argues that the Heroikos can be seen as a 
foil against which to interpret contemporary concerns with the formation of the 
Christian canon, correct ritual and ethical practices. While the Heroikos itself is 
not influenced by Christian practices, the text reveals concerns and questions that 
illuminate the ways in which religious identity is created and promoted in late 
antiquity. 
With the exception of Kate Blair-Dixon's "Magic, Dreams, and Ritual in the 
Iroquois Conversion," the chapters of the preceding sections focus primarily on 
the Greek and Roman worlds of classical antiquity. Ellen Bradshaw Aitken's 
"The Cult of Achilles in Philostratus' Heroikos: A Study in the Relation of 
Canon and Ritual" takes us into the early third century A.D. with an analysis of a 
Greek text that appears to share certain central concerns with early Christianity. 
The essays in the third section bring us abruptly into the early Byzantine period 
and medieval France. Something needs to be said by way of transition. 
Let us take as our point of departure Aitken's suggestion that Philostratus' 
dialogue about Greek hero cult offers important insights for students of early 
Christianity. Her call to bridge the traditional disciplinary boundaries between 
classics and New Testament studies draws attention to the value for scholarship 
of treating religious traditions that are contemporary with each other as 
communities in conversation rather than isolated entities living in their own 
hermetically sealed environments. We must acknowledge that we are anticipated 
in this enterprise by a series of ongoing conversations between Christians and 
their contemporaries that were an important moment in the formation of a 
Christian identity. The writings of Justin Martyr, Origen, and Tertullian, among 
28. See Jones 1996, especially for the (often neglected) religious aspects of the cult; 
also Spawforth and Walker 1985 and 1986. 
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others, show that this conversation was well under way by the third century. The 
tenns of the conversation change after the third century, and the emotional pitch 
intensifies, to be sure, but the conversation continues, a dialogue between past 
and present as well as between religious communities living side by side. 
Christian polemicists in late antiquity have bequeathed to us their side of the 
conversation between Christianity and other religious traditions around the 
Mediterranean. Their perspective on the complex religious world of the fourth 
and fifth centuries A.D. was of great importance for the creation of Christian 
identity in the early Byzantine east, to say nothing of its significance for later 
scholarship. They represented late antiquity as driven by a conflict between two 
mutually hostile and unequal antagonists, Christianity and paganism.29 The 
climax of this conflict was the sudden, violent, and spectacular triumph of a 
united and aggressive Christian church in league with a centralized imperial 
authority over a homogeneous pagan religion in the turbulent years at the end of 
the fourth and the beginning of the fifth centuries. The litany of Christian 
victories over their pagan enemies in this period is impressive: the ban on animal 
sacrifice, the abolition of nocturnal festivals, the destruction of the Serapaeum, 
and, to carry the list into the early fifth century, the murder of Hypatia in A.D. 
415. According to this view, the "Christianization" of the Roman Empire was a 
debate between a dying paganism defending a doomed past and a vibrant 
Christianity pointing the way to the future. This narrative yielded some of the 
important referents by which Christian polemicists could orient and define their 
religion: a pagan religion against which they could define themselves, as well as 
a past which had been superceded and to which the pagan other could be safely 
banished. 
The problem of the "Christianization" of the Roman Empire must be 
approached with great caution. The very tenns "Christian" and "pagan" are 
ideologically charged. The unity of late-antique Christianity, fragmented by 
doctrinal disagreement and political rivalry, is questionable, and there never was 
a single "pagan" church: the tenn "paganism" itself has been foisted on a wide 
variety of religious traditions, many of which had nothing more in common with 
each other than they did with Christianity. It is helpful in this regard to recall 
Pierre Chuvin's explanation of "paganism" as a blanket tenn for a wide variety 
of religious practices that were seen as local and traditional;30 pagans were 
people attached to the traditional practices that were constitutive of their local 
29. Brown 1995. 
30. Chuvin 1990:9. 
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identities. Chuvin's survey of the religious world of late antiquity shows that 
these practices flourished in many parts of the empire well into the seventh 
century.31 In rural districts, where imperial regulation was weak, traditional local 
cult thrived openly; in urban centers, where imperial authority was strong, 
traditional religion survived too, though it had to accommodate itself to the 
realities of imperial regulation. 
Despite the advantage that imperial patronage gave to Christianity, there were 
a number of factors that encouraged Christians and pagans to find a modus 
vivendi in late antiquity. We have already mentioned the attachment to local 
traditions that exerted an influence on both pagans and Christians. Peter Brown 
has rightly called attention to the importance of paideia as a constitutive element 
of the identity of the urban elites in late antiquity.32 Paideia is the education in 
Hellenic culture, focused mainly on rhetoric, that provided the urban elites with a 
common language and a sense of participation in a shared trans-Mediterranean 
culture. The connection between Hellenism and Greek religion is discussed in 
several chapters in parts I and II of this collection, e.g., Varhelyi, Asirvatham, 
and Aitken. Hellenism in late antiquity was an internationalizing factor that 
linked distant cities and, of equal importance, was a medium of cultural 
continuity that linked late antiquity to a long pre-Christian tradition. Glen 
Bowersock's observation that hellenismos means both "Hellenism" and "pagan" 
(and is in fact the only word for "pagan" in Greek at this period}33 shows the 
close involvement of paideia with "pagan" religion. The fact that paideia was 
shared by the upper echelons of the Christian clergy and the imperial 
bureaucracy, as well as the urban elites, complicates our notion of Christian 
identity in late antiquity. 
Chapters 8 and 9 explore the ways in which Christians in late-antique 
Byzantium confronted, reproduced, and adapted fonns of religious life inherited 
from the pagan past. The particular focus of these essays is on powerful objects 
and images-amulets and rings-that protect their users against the dangerous 
forces from the unseen world that wreak havoc on the lives of mortals in this 
world. These apotropaic objects are devices for coping with misfortunes that are 
common to everyday life but nonetheless disasters from the point of view of the 
afflicted: sickness, miscarriage, and marital discord. Seen from the perspective 
of religious orthodoxy, such practices appear marginal rather than mainstream, 
3 1 .  Chuvin 1990. 
32. Brown I 992:chapter 2. 
33. Bowersock 1996:9-12. 
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but it is important to note that their involvement with the concerns of everyday 
life make them central to the daily experience of their users, and also help to 
illuminate the religious world of ordinary citizens, something that is much more 
difficult to recover, for example, in literary texts. 
Mary Margaret (Molly) Fulghum's "Coins Used as Amulets in Late Antiquity" 
(chapter 8) is a study of the iconography of coins and contorniates that were 
pierced to be worn as amulets in the early Byzantine period up to the seventh 
century A.D. Her point of departure is a sixth-century coin with a portrait of 
Justinian on the obverse that bears evidence of having been used as an amulet 
bu� that deviates in puzzling ways from the standard iconography familiar from 
other Byzantine pierced-coin amulets. Her investigation sheds light on some of 
the strategies for adapting earlier religious practices to a Christian context. Old 
symbols are retained and invested with new Christian meaning. The old goddess 
Nike, famously expelled from the Roman Curia in A.D. 392, is recalled from 
exile with a new identity as a Christian angel. Holy rider images are ambiguous: 
they may represent the Christian saint Sisinnios, or the biblical Solomon, but 
they may also be the Macedonian conqueror, Alexander the Great. The power of 
imperial portraits, including the Christian emperors Constantine and Justinian, 
the second-century co-emperors Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus, as well as 
Alexander the Great, is of special interest in connection with the chapters on 
imperial and Hellenistic ruler cult in part I I  of this collection. As with Nike and 
the Holy Rider images, the traditional power of imperial symbols is mediated 
through a process of Christianization. The emperor is placed in a new relation to 
the divine order as God's representative on earth, whose power can be invoked 
and manipulated for private ends by the owner of an amulet. 
The subject of Fulghum's chapter brings us once more to the complex 
relationship between magic and religion. Are the amulets Fulghum describes 
magical or religious artifacts? In the context of the early Byzantine period, the 
question is whether the Byzantines would have understood the use of amulets to 
be an acceptable Christian practice or an illicit magical practice. A consideration 
of the status of amulets in late antiquity brings to light no general agreement 
about their place in a Christian society. It should be emphasized first of all that 
there were no secular laws defining and regulating amulets as magical objects. 
This fact is not surprising: in general, the Roman legal system dealt with magic 
on an ad hoc basis as certain practices were perceived to threaten social and 
political stability. Imperial legislation on magic in the fourth and fifth centuries 
made various fonns of divination a capital crime, but did not define other fonns 
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of magic.34 There is no evidence that secular authorities took any cognizance of 
amulets as a problem. In the absence of imperial interest in the subject, it fell to 
church leaders to address the question. The church was hampered in its attempts 
to distinguish magic from religion by the embarrassing silence of scripture on the 
subject: magic is rarely condemned in the Bible, and clear definitions are 
difficult to extract.35 The diversity of amulets in material and function would 
have made them especially difficult to define and regulate.36 The 
pronouncements of church fathers on amulets could be ambiguous. John 
Chrysostom, for fXample, condemned the use of coins of Alexander the Great as 
amulets, but els�where suggested that certain indubitably Christian symbols such 
as the cross could provide protection against the evil eye, leaving open the 
possibility that some amulets with Christian symbols might be pennissible. Many 
of the amulets that Fulghum discusses bear signs that were frankly Christian or 
that could be given a Christian interpretation; one may sunnise that their users 
were sensitive to criticisms of the sort found in Chrysostom and were attempting 
to "Christianize" their amulets. The Council in Trullo (A.D. 691-692) condemned 
"furnishers of amulets" in its sixty-first canon, but the text does not specify what 
kind of amulets were intended; the context of the passage is a condemnation of 
various forms of divination, so it is possible that the council was concerned with 
amulets used in divination, not apotropaic objects.37 Archaeological evidence 
34. The laws are collected in Mommsen and Meyer 1905:9.16.1-12. Astrologers 
(mathematici), diviners (haruspices, hario/i), dream interpreters, Chaldaeans, and magi 
are banned. Note that a law of Constantine (9.16.3) exempts magical remedies for illness 
and magic for the protection of crops from rain and hail; subsequent legislation 
eliminates these exemptions. 
35. Dickie in Maguire 1995:9- 1 1 .  
36. Amulets could be made of metal, stone, leather, parchment, cloth, human or animal 
remains, etc. Christian and non-Christian symbols and pictures appear, as well as text. 
For examples of Christian amulets from Egypt that use Christian scripture, see Meyer and 
Smith 1994:33-35. David Frankfurter's survey of amulets in late antiquity gives an idea 
of their enonnous variety: Bowersock, Brown, and Graber 1999, s. v. "amulets." 
Perforated coins are not mentioned in his article. 
37. See Trombley 1978: 1-19 for a discussion of the Council in Trullo; p. 6 for the 
Sixty-First Canon. Balsamon's twelfth-century commentary on the canon does not clarify 
the issue: he cites the case of a priest who used a baby's swaddling clothes as an amulet, 
as well as other instances where priests and monks used various objects for divination. 
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from the Byzantine settlement at Anemurium38 coupled with the testimony of 
literary sources suggests that amulets of many kinds were commonly used in late 
antiquity. It is quite likely that many amulet wearers did not think of themselves 
as practicing magic, but rather as taking prudent countermeasures against hostile 
magic.39 
The question of the relationship between magic and religion is not merely an 
abstract theoretical exercise: our understanding of these concepts continues to 
have important practical implications for scholarly research and affects our 
interpretation of ancient artifacts. Alicia Walker's "A Reconsideration of Early 
Byzantine Marriage Rings" (chapter 9) reviews a recent debate about the 
interpretation of the potent words and symbols that appear on marriage rings 
from the early Byzantine period. Scholars studying these rings have started from 
the premise that they functioned as magical objects; this premise has given rise 
to a theory that situates the rings in a wider context of Byzantine magical 
practices. The occasional appearance of the word hygieia ("health") on some 
marriage rings together with other formal similarities has led previous 
researchers to explain the rings in the light of contemporary Byzantine magico­
medical practices as charms against miscarriage, but this explanation, as Walker 
shows, is not borne out by a rigorous examination of the evidence. We are 
fortunate in this case that the matter can be settled on methodological grounds, 
but Walker's findings raise larger questions about how scholars are to make 
sense of the disparate practices subsumed under the broad category of magic. 
Walker's chapter, like Fulghum's, is concerned with the Christian adaptation 
of older traditions. Our knowledge of Roman prototypes for the rings discussed 
by Walker yields important insights into the ways in which Byzantine couples 
See F�gen 1995:99-115, esp. 102. 
38. Russel 1995. 
39. The same point is made in Meyer and Smith 1994:2 in regard to "magical" texts 
from Christian Egypt: "The texts themselves, as we point out in the notes, rarely use the 
word mageia, or other Greek and Coptic words we translate as 'magic' and 'sorcery.' Our 
texts are frequently invocations of the powers to protect the person from 'magic,' from 
sorcery, and against the evil eye. The users did not, therefore, consider themselves 
practitioners of 'magic,' which they regarded as a negative term. The terms of positive 
description they use, phylakterion and apologia, 'amulet' and 'spell,' really just mean 
'protection' and 'defense.' Since the practices are a means of fighting back against 
magical attack, 'magic' does not seem a fitting description." Greenfield notes that in later 
Byzantine "magical" texts words like mageia and goeteia are avoided ( 1995: 120-121 ). 
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reproduced and adapted traditional strategies to cope with threats to the stability 
of marital life. Certain potent symbols inherited from pre-Christian traditions 
were retained when compatible with Christianity. Under this category are 
included phrases such as homonoia ("concord" or "harmony") and kharis 
("grace," specifically "divine grace"), which could easily be interpreted in 
Christian terms. Other forms required a more drastic alteration. The locus 
sanctus scenes on Greco-Roman marriage rings, in which a divinity blesses the 
married couple, is transformed into a blessing received from an appropriate 
Christian source: Christ, the Virgin Mary, and sometimes the cross. The 
persistence of such forms from the Greco-Roman period through the seventh 
century shows both their resiliency and the flexibility of Christianity. 
The problem of relating an iconographical interpretation to its wider cultural 
context is taken up by Amanda Luyster in "The Femme-aux-Serpents at 
Moissac: Luxuria (Lust) or a Bad Mother?" (chapter 10). Her chapter is a 
detailed study of the femme-aux-serpents ("woman with snakes") panel on the 
south porch of a twelfth-century church in Moissac. Previous scholarship has 
explained the femme-aux-serpents figure as an allegorical figure for the 
punishment of luxuria, an interpretation that works well for other representations 
of the figure, but that does not account for some of the puzzling features of the 
femme-aux-serpents at Moissac, in particular the presence of two toads, one 
issuing from the mouth of a demon, the other positioned near the pudenda of a 
nude woman. Luyster's project includes a study of the figure of the bad mother 
in medieval Christian literature and a survey of the significance of toads in 
medieval culture. Her aim is the recovery of the possible meanings, for a 
medieval viewer, of the individual elements of the Moissac femme-aux-serpents, 
and the result is a daring and original reading of the overall program of the 
Moissac south porch. 
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